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Abstract
The Runway Safety Monitor (RSM) designed by Lockheed Martin is part of NASA’s eﬀort to
reduce aviation accidents. We developed a Petri net model of the RSM protocol and used the
model checking functions of our tool SMART to investigate behaviors that can be classiﬁed as
missed alarm scenarios in RSM. To apply discrete-state techniques and mitigate the impact of
the resulting state-space explosion phenomenon, our model uses a highly discretized view of the
system obtained by partitioning the monitored runway zone into a grid of smaller volumes and
by considering scenarios involving only two aircraft. The model also assumes that there are no
communication failures, such as bad input from radar or lack of incoming data, thus it relies on
a consistent view of reality by all participants. In spite of these simpliﬁcations, we were able to
expose potential problems in the RSM conceptual design. Our ﬁndings were forwarded to the
design engineers, who undertook corrective action. The results stress the high level of eﬃciency
attained by the new model checking algorithms implemented in our tool SMART, and demonstrate
their applicability to real-world systems. Attempts to verify RSM with NuSMV and SPIN have
failed due to excessive memory consumption.
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1 Introduction
As the systems that are put into operation grow in complexity every year, an
increasing part of the functionality of modern aircraft is shifted to computer-
based, automated devices. However, this rapid advance in sophistication is
not matched by an equal advance in the degree of certiﬁcation of the deployed
devices. This is due to the tremendous amounts of resources, measured in time,
human expertise, and money, required for the analysis of complex systems.
The ﬁeld of formal methods oﬀers an alternative to traditional testing
approaches that can explore only a limited number of scenarios. Formal ver-
iﬁcation uses rigorous mathematical techniques to exhaustively check that a
model of the system satisﬁes a set of desired properties.
Model checking, which has gained increased popularity since the early
1990s, is a completely automatic technique that relies on discovering the set
of reachable states of the model and evaluating whether a given property,
expressed in a temporal logic, is satisﬁed or not. The model is usually speciﬁed
in a modeling language, such as automata, Petri nets, or pseudo-code. If a
temporal property holds, model checking certiﬁes it with 100% conﬁdence.
When a property does not hold, the model checking tool provides a counter-
example, in the form of an execution path in the model, which can illustrate
the source of the errors.
In using these computerized tools to verify modern protocols, the major
obstacle is usually the state-space explosion phenomenon. As the size and com-
plexity of a model increases, the size of the state-space also increases, some-
times to exponentially larger sets of states. Nevertheless, advances in model
checking techniques, particularly in symbolic model checking, have made it
possible to analyze systems with extremely large state spaces.
Model checking has been particularly successful in the veriﬁcation of com-
plex, mostly synchronous, circuit designs. However, until recently, it has usu-
ally been considered inadequate for verifying large asynchronous protocols
and software. For the last several years, our research has successfully targeted
the class of globally-asynchronous locally-synchronous systems, consisting of
a number of loosely coupled systems (homogeneous or heterogeneous) that
evolve somewhat independently of each other.
Recently, NASA and Lockheed Martin have begun developing a protocol to
detect runway incidents, called the Runway Safety Monitor (RSM) [11], which
represents an excellent candidate for our techniques. While its veriﬁcation
was challenging and pushed our computational resources to the limit, we were
able to discover many interesting scenarios that constitute potential hazards.
Equally signiﬁcant, however, is the fact that so few hazards were discovered
R.I. Siminiceanu, G. Ciardo / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 128 (2005) 179–194180
overall. Compared to the total number of 6.7 × 1042 reachable states, this is
strong evidence that RSM is robust and safe.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Sections 2 and 3 describe
RSM and our tool SMART, which we used for this study. Section 4 gives the
details of the RSM model we developed and Section 5 reports on the results
of our analysis. Finally, Section 6 summarizes our work and discusses ideas
for future extensions.
2 The Runway Safety Monitor
The Runway Safety Monitor (RSM) is a component of NASA’s Runway In-
cursion Prevention System (RIPS) research [15]. Designed and implemented
by Lockheed Martin engineers, RSM is intended to be incorporated in the In-
tegrated Display System (IDS) [2], a suite of cockpit systems which NASA has
been developing since 1993. IDS also includes other incursion detection and
prevention algorithms, such as TCAS II [10]. The IDS design enables RSM to
exploit existing data communications facilities, displays, Global Positioning
System (GPS), ground surveillance system information, and data-links.
Collision avoidance protocols already exist and operate. TCAS [10] has
been in use since 1994, and is now required by the FAA on all commercial US
aircraft. TCAS has a full formal speciﬁcation, but it has been veriﬁed only
partially, due to its complexity [3,12]. SATS [1], also under development at
NASA Langley, is intended to help ensure safe landings of general aviation
craft at towerless regional airports and will instead be formally veriﬁed.
Purpose of RSM. The goal of the Runway Safety Monitor is to detect run-
way incursions, deﬁned by the FAA as “any occurrence at an airport involving
an aircraft, vehicle, person, or object on the ground, that creates a collision
hazard or results in the loss of separation with an aircraft taking oﬀ, intending
to take oﬀ, landing, or intending to land”. 3
Since most air safety incidents occur on or near runways, the Runway
Safety Monitor plays a key role in accident avoidance. RSM is not intended
to prevent incursions, but to detect them and alert the pilots. Prevention
is provided by other components of RIPS in the form of a number of IDS
capabilities such as head-up displays, electronic moving maps, cockpit display
of traﬃc information, and taxi routing. Experimental studies conducted by
Lockheed Martin [11,16] showed that incursion situations are less likely to
occur when IDS technology is employed on aircraft. The RSM should greatly
improve this positive eﬀect.
3 cf. http://www.faa.gov/runwaysafety/.
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Fig. 1. Top-level design of the RSM algorithm.
RSM design. Figure 1 shows the high-level architecture of the RSM algo-
rithm. RSM runs on a device installed in the cockpit and is activated prior
to takeoﬀ and landing procedures on airports. An independent copy of RSM
runs on each aircraft and refers to the aircraft on which it is operating as
ownship and to other aircraft, ground vehicles using the same runway, or even
physical obstacles such as equipment, as targets.
RSM monitors traﬃc in a zone surrounding the runway where the takeoﬀ
or landing is to take place. The zone is a 3-D volume of space that runs up
to 220 feet laterally from each edge of the runway, up to 400 feet of altitude
above the runway, and 1.1 nautical miles from each runway end (the 400 feet
altitude corresponds to a 3◦ glide slope for takeoﬀ/landing trajectories).
The protocol, implemented as a C-language program, consists of a repeat-
loop over three major phases. In the ﬁrst phase, RSM gathers traﬃc informa-
tion from radar updates received through a data-link. It identiﬁes each target
present in the monitored zone and stores its 3-D physical coordinates. The
frequency of the updates may not be constant, updates can be lost, and data
might even be faulty. The implications of data-link errors or omissions are
not addressed in this study, but present a challenging task for future study.
These errors have already been the subject of some experimental measure-
ments [16], and their analysis calls for a stochastic ﬂavor not captured in our
present model, which is instead concerned only with logical errors.
In the second phase, the algorithm assigns a status to each target, from a
predetermined set of values that includes taxi, pre-takeoﬀ, takeoﬀ, climb out,
landing, roll out, and ﬂy-through modes. We discuss in detail the meaning of
these state when we describe our model of the system.
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Target → taxi takeoﬀ climbout land rollout ﬂythru
Ownship ↓
taxi — a ∧ f a ∧ f a ∧ f a ∧ c ∧ f —
takeoﬀ a ∧ f d ∨ e d ∨ e d ∨ e a ∨ d b ∧ c
climbout a ∧ f d ∨ e d ∨ e d ∨ e d ∨ e b ∧ c
land a ∧ f d ∨ e d ∨ e d ∨ e a ∨ d b ∧ c
rollout a ∧ c ∧ f a ∨ d a ∨ d a ∨ d d ∨ e b ∧ c
ﬂythru — b ∧ c b ∧ c b ∧ c b ∧ c —
a: Distance closing
b: In takeoﬀ/landing path
c: Distance less than minimum separation
d: Takeoﬀ/landing in same direction, distance less than minimum separation
e: Takeoﬀ/landing in opposite direction, distance closing
f : Taxi/stationary on or near runway
Table 1
Operational state matrix for setting the alarm.
The third phase is responsible for detecting incursions, and is performed
for each target based on the spatial attributes (position, heading, accelera-
tion) of ownship and target, plus some logical conditions. Table 1 shows the
operational state matrix of this phase. Our analysis focuses on certifying that
this decision procedure is able to detect all possible incursion scenarios, or on
ﬁnding possible incursion scenarios where RSM fails to raise an alarm.
3 General overview of the SMART tool
To model the Runway Safety Monitor, we employ our tool, SMART (the
Stochastic and Model checking Analyzer for Reliability and Timing) [4], which
we developed for the logical and stochastic analysis of complex systems. Given
a formal description of a system as a (stochastic) Petri net, SMART can
perform state-space construction, verify temporal-logic properties, and provide
eﬃcient numerical solutions for timing and stochastic analysis. SMART has
several advantages over most other model checkers:
• Compact (sublinear) storage structure for states [13].
• Extremely compact encoding of transition relations between states [7].
• Eﬃcient symbolic state-space exploration algorithms based on saturation
[5], a state-of-the-art iteration method for symbolic model checking.
• Fast generation of counter-examples [8].
SMART accepts as input a Turing-equivalent version of Petri nets [14].
Each SMART input ﬁle deﬁnes one or more structured (i.e., partitioned into
submodels) state-based models. A model can be parameterized and deﬁnes a
set of measures, which, in our case, can be thought of as logical queries to be
evaluated by systematic state exploration. The input syntax is detailed in the
SMART User Manual, available at http://cs.ucr.edu/~ciardo/SMART/.
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4 The SMART model of RSM
To model the RSM, we ﬁrst identify the variables representing the system state
and the events describing the potential state-to-state transitions. Then, we
translate this information into a Petri net for input into SMART. We partition
the model into 3n + 3 submodels where n is the number of targets moving
inside the zone. The variables of the ﬁrst three submodels describe the state
of ownship. The variables of the other n groups of 3 submodels describe the
state of each target. For each aircraft, the relevant attributes are:
Location: a 3-D vector (x, y, z), where the X-axis is across the width of the
runway, the Y -axis is along the length, and the Z-axis is on the vertical.
Speed and heading: a second 3-D vector (vx, vy, vz).
Acceleration along the runway: ay.
Status: an enumerated type variable.
Alarm ﬂag: a boolean variable.
Phase: an integer variable.
All other variables are deemed irrelevant to our study and can be abstracted
away from the model to reduce the size of its state space.
Domain of the state variables. Since SMART operates on discrete-type
systems, abstraction by discretization is necessary to cope with the continuous-
type variables of the RSM algorithm. To come up with good representations
of the variable domains, we start with the roughest possible discretization that
can be extracted from the protocol speciﬁcations, and then reﬁne it further
as needed. As modelers, we had to take into consideration a balanced solu-
tion between a very rough discretization (which potentially merges too many
meaningful behaviors by collapsing distinct states into a single representative),
and a discretization that is too ﬁne to allow an eﬃcient state-space generation
(which prevents analysis due to the state-space explosion problem). In the
end, we chose the following domains:
• The coordinates x, y, z could be as simple as x, y, z ∈ {0, 1, 2}, where 0
means out of the monitored zone, 1 means in the vicinity, and 2 means
on the runway. However, we chose a ﬁner parametric representation: x ∈
{0, ...,maxx}, y ∈ {0, ...,max y}, and z ∈ {0, ...,max z}, where 0 means
outside the zone, and the constants max x, max y, and max z can be adjusted
to the modeler’s preference. In other words, location (0, 0, 0) represents
all positions outside the zone. A target that exits the zone, or has not
yet entered it, is assigned this location. As an alternative, we could have
used an “outer layer” of locations surrounding the monitored zone, but
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1 2 3 4
1
2
Real trajectory:  (51.5, 161.3), (128.5, 93.6), (220.1, 80.3), (318.5, 111.2), (371.1, 183.1), ...
Discretized trajectory:   (1,2),             (2,1),              (3,1),               (4,2),               (4,2), ... 
t=2.0
t=2.5 t=3.0
t=3.5
t=4.0
Discretized speed:       (+1,-1),         (+1,-1),            (+1,0),           (+1,+1),            (+1,+1), ...
Fig. 2. Discretized target trajectories in 2-D.
this would unnecessarily increase the state space with entries of the form
(0, y, z), (x, 0, z), (x, y, 0), (maxx +1, y, z), (x,maxy +1, z), (x, y,maxz +1),
all representing the same circumstance: the target is not being monitored.
• The speed values vx, vy, vz could be assigned the domain {0,±1,±2}, where
0 means not moving, ±1 means moving slowly (below the predetermined taxi
speed threshold TS of 45 knots), and ±2 means moving fast (above TS) in
either direction along an axis. Again, a better representation is vx, vy, vz ∈
{−max speed , ..., 0, ...,max speed}, using another parameter max speed .
• The acceleration ay has two relevant values: non-negative or negative.
• The status is in {out , taxi , pretakeoﬀ , takeoﬀ , climb, land , rollout ,ﬂythru}.
• The phase is in {radar update, set status , detect}.
The 3-D motion of targets. Our discretization divides the monitored zone
into a number of volumes arranged in a 3-D grid. As a result, the possible
positions of the aircraft are identiﬁed by a ﬁnite number of grid cells, from
the discrete domain {(0, 0, 0)} ∪ {1, ...,maxx} × {1, ...,maxy} × {1, ...,maxz}.
Similarly, continuous trajectories are represented by abstract, discretized tra-
jectories through the cells of the 3-D grid. This is a reasonable compromise
when modeling continuous variables with discrete-state approaches. Then, we
enforce the following modeling constraints:
• Movement is allowed only between adjacent cells. In principle, a target is
free to remain in the current cell or move to any of the neighboring 26 cells,
corresponding to a nondeterministic decrease, no change, or increase in the
coordinates x, y, and z. However, the changes must be consistent with the
heading. For example, x cannot decrease when vx is positive. Figure 2
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shows an example of discretized trajectory in 2-D space.
• When an aircraft in cell (0, 0, 0) enters the monitored zone, its position
is nondeterministically chosen on the frontier, i.e., x ∈ {1,maxx}, y ∈
{1,max y}, or z = max z (not z = 1, as no entry is possible from below
ground). Analogously, an aircraft can leave the monitored zone only from
the frontier.
• The entry speed parameters are also chosen nondeterministically, but con-
sistently with the direction of entry. For example, a target cannot enter
from the left with a negative vx.
Each of these restrictions is enforced in the Petri net model by means of
inhibitor arcs and transition guards. The model might nevertheless include
unrealistic trajectories. This is acceptable in the veriﬁcation process as long as
all realistic behaviors are covered by the model. If a property holds globally in
the abstract model, then it will also hold in the realistic model. However, if a
property does not hold globally, we must check the corresponding counterex-
ample generated by SMART to determine whether it represents a realistic
scenario or not.
Status deﬁnitions. In the second phase of the execution loop, the status
variable of each aircraft is deterministically updated using the other state
information. To model this phase, we deﬁne the status values as follows:
out : not in the monitored zone
≡ (x = 0) ∧ (y = 0) ∧ (z = 0)
taxi : on the ground, either at low speed or not with a runway heading
≡ (z = 1)
∧
((|vx| ≤ TS ∧ |vy| ≤ TS) ∨ (vx = 0))
takeoﬀ roll : on the ground, with a runway heading, accelerating
≡ (z = 1) ∧ (|vy| > TS) ∧ (vx = 0) ∧ (ay ≥ 0)
rollout : on the ground, with a runway heading, decelerating
≡ (z = 1) ∧ (|vy| > TS) ∧ (vx = 0) ∧ (ay < 0)
climbout : airborne, with a runway heading, positive vertical speed
≡ (z > 1) ∧ (vx = 0) ∧ (vz > 0)
land : airborne, with a runway heading, negative vertical speed
≡ (z > 1) ∧ (vx = 0) ∧ (vz ≤ 0)
ﬂythru : airborne, not in climbout or land mode
≡ (z > 1) ∧ (vx = 0)
Note that the predicates z = 1 and z > 1 used above also imply x > 0 and
y > 0, since the non-monitored zone is represented by the single cell (0, 0, 0),
not by a rim of states. Also, the acceleration ay, needed to discern between
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maxx ×max y ×maxz max speed 1 target 2 targets 3 targets 4 targets
Number of states in the model
3×5×3 2 1.0×1013 3.4×1019 1.1×1026 3.5×1032
5×10×5 2 4.1×1014 8.4×1021 1.7×1029 3.5×1036
10×10×10 2 7.6×1015 6.6×1023 5.8×1031 5.0×1039
3×5×3 5 2.7×1014 4.4×1021 7.2×1028 1.2×1036
5×10×5 5 8.3×1015 7.6×1023 6.9×1031 6.3×1039
10×10×10 5 1.4×1017 5.0×1025 1.8×1034 6.7×1042
State-space generation time (seconds)
3×5×3 2 2.01 2.93 3.93 4.91
5×10×5 2 5.52 8.27 11.19 13.91
10×10×10 2 13.62 20.58 27.50 34.42
3×5×3 5 4.41 6.51 8.77 10.98
5×10×5 5 12.91 19.07 25.42 32.05
10×10×10 5 28.45 42.84 57.25 71.75
State-space generation memory (MBytes)
3×5×3 2 2.00 3.00 4.00 4.99
5×10×5 2 7.21 10.81 14.41 18.01
10×10×10 2 20.86 31.29 41.72 52.15
3×5×3 5 4.22 6.33 8.44 10.55
5×10×5 5 15.48 23.21 30.95 38.69
10×10×10 5 39.73 59.59 79.45 99.31
Table 2
Results from parametric state-space generation.
takeoﬀ and rollout status, does not need to be modeled directly, since its value
is computed on the spot based on the old and new values of variable vy.
State-space measurements. The model just described can be used as
a building block for further analysis, since it captures the free movement of
targets in 3-D space (phase one of RSM) and the target status assignments
(phase two of RSM). We can then either model the third phase directly, or
deﬁne queries that, using a combination of status and position variables, de-
termine whether the alarm would have been set correctly. We choose to model
the setting of the alarm directly by adding transitions to the Petri net model.
To evaluate the complexity of the core model, we collected measurements
of the state spaces generated for diﬀerent input parameters: number of targets
(n), grid size (max x × max y × max z), and speed thresholds (max speed ). The
state-space size, runtime, and memory consumption are listed in Table 2. The
results show that the reachability set can be generated for multiple targets,
a fairly large size of grid, and multiple thresholds of speed in a matter of
minutes, using under 100 MBytes of memory.
5 Model checking RSM
For the logical analysis of the protocol, we use the model checking module of
SMART. Model checking is concerned with verifying temporal logic properties
of discrete-state systems evolving in time. SMART implements the branching
time Computation Tree Logic (CTL) [9].
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ownship position
target position
min. sep. radius
ownship = taxi
target = taxi
distance > min. sep.
alarm = OFF
ownship = takeoff
target = taxi
distance < min. sep.
alarm = ON
ownship = takeoff
target = taxi
distance < min. sep.
alarm = OFF
Fig. 3. Scenario for the memory-less property (ground level).
Notation and formal deﬁnitions. The operational state matrix in Table
1 lists the alarm setting criteria, as given in the documentation of the RSM
algorithm [11]. Our study aims at exhaustively checking whether this opera-
tional matrix is able to detect all incursion scenarios. A situation where two
aircraft get within minimum separation, i.e., in adjacent cells for our model,
without the alarm variable having been set is from now on called a missed
alarm scenario. The following predicates are used to describe properties of
interest (subscripts o and t refer to ownship and target, respectively):
done ≡ phaseo=detect ∧ phaset=detect (updates are complete)
sep ≡ distance(o, t) > min. sep. (no loss of minimum separation)
alarm ≡ alarmo=true (alarm has been raised)
track ≡ statuso ∈{taxi ,ﬂythru} ∨ status t ∈{taxi ,ﬂythru}
(at least one aircraft is taking oﬀ or landing)
A “memory-less” property. “Is there a tracked state where minimum
separation is lost and the alarm is oﬀ ?”
• CTL syntax: EF (done ∧ track ∧ ¬sep ∧ ¬alarm)
A scenario that leads to a state satisfying this query arises when the condition
“distance is closing” is not satisﬁed in the current state. This is the case of
the third snapshot of Figure 3. However, this might not correspond to an
unwanted behavior, since the alarm might have been set in a previous state,
when the minimum separation was lost. The value of the alarm variable also
depends on whether or not the alarm is “aged” for a few more cycles.
Nevertheless, the situation is still of potential concern, even with aging
of the alarm, since the target can maintain a constant distance (at less than
minimum separation) for longer than the duration of the aging, eventually
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landing path
ownship = landing
target = flythru
distance > min. sep.
alarm = OFF
ownship = landing
target = flythru
distance < min. sep.
not in landing path !
alarm = OFF
ownship position
target position
min. sep. radius
Fig. 4. Scenario 2 (airborne).
resulting in a “bad state” in the round after the alarm expires.
Note that the “memory-less” nature of the query inﬂuences the result. We
looked at the property in a particular snapshot of time, without considering the
sequence of events leading to the current state. To get a better understanding
of the system, we next investigate the states of the system immediately after
the minimum separation distance between two aircraft is lost.
Analysis of the transition that causes loss of separation. “Is there a
state where minimum separation is lost by transitioning to the current state
while the alarm is oﬀ ?”
• CTL: EF (done∧track∧sep∧E[(¬done) U (done∧track∧¬sep∧¬alarm)])
Note that the nested EU operator in the query (instead of an EX) is due
to the fact that several state transitions are needed to complete the update
of coordinates (3), status (1) and to set the alarm again (1). A witness for
this query (see Figure 4) has ownship in a landing or climbout state, the
target ﬂying across the runway faster than ownship, moving within separation
distance from the side at an angle. The condition for setting an alarm in
this circumstance is “distance less than minimum separation and target in
takeoﬀ/landing path”. The second term is not satisﬁed, hence no alarm is
raised. Aircraft can actually collide (trajectories intersect in Figure 4), while
none of the participants are ever warned.
The above scenario is the only one generating “bad states” for this query,
a fact attesting to the robustness of RSM. This situation can be corrected by
adding distance less than minimum separation as part of the criterion for this
combination of statuses.
Note that we included the predicate track in both states (before and after
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ownship = taxi
target = taxi
distance < min. sep.
alarm = OFF
ownship = takeoff
target = taxi
distance < min. sep.
alarm = OFF
ownship position
target position
min. sep. radius
Fig. 5. Scenario 3 (ground level).
the transition), as we are interested in scenarios involving only takeoﬀ and/or
landing trajectories. However, this additional constraint could mask some
other undesired behaviors. Therefore, we next ask a more general question.
A stronger safety property. “Is there a tracked state where minimum
separation is lost, reachable without EVER previously setting the alarm?”
• CTL: E[(¬alarm) U (done ∧ track ∧ ¬sep ∧ ¬alarm)];
Several example scenarios satisfy this query.
Example 1. (see Figure 5) Actors enter the stage taxiing fast, not aligned to
the runway, at close distance to each other. Once on the runway, one of them
(say ownship) changes direction and aligns itself to the runway. Thereafter,
it is categorized as takeoﬀ (or climbout, if it becomes airborne). The other
aircraft stays within minimum separation, but it does not close in: it can
be either behind ownship or, more dangerously, in front of it. No alarm is
raised because the criterion “distance is closing” is, again, not satisﬁed. If the
distance between aircraft at entry is very small, there might not be enough
time for an escape maneuver, even if the alarm is later on set by closing in.
Figure 5 shows an abstract trace that contradicts the safety property. The
trajectories are shown for a horizontal section in the monitored zone at ground
level. The positions of the aircraft are given for each radar scan. The third
snapshot illustrates the “bad state” of the system: the two aircraft are within
minimum separation distance, but no alarm has been issued either for the
current state or any of the previous states in the scenario.
Example 2. An identical scenario exists for airborne states that are not
tracked (status ﬂythru).
Example 3. There are additional scenarios that do not satisfy the safety
property, where events develop immediately after both planes enter the mon-
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itored zone. The bad behavior in these cases is caused by the fact that the
previous position is unknown — coordinates (0, 0, 0) in our model — for both
planes, hence their distance cannot be closing in the currrent state. If the
airplanes enter the zone simultaneously, at positions very close to each other
(e.g., both are trying to land), the ﬂag will not be raised. However, this behav-
ior is exhibited only by our theoretical model, due to our choice of modeling
conventions, and not by the actual implementation of the protocol of the RSM
device.
To summarize the common characteristics of the above scenarios, we ob-
serve that the key factor is that both aircraft are taxi/ﬂythru when minimum
separation is lost, hence the situation is not tracked (a potentially bad oc-
currence is masked by a protocol speciﬁcation). Subsequently, the predicate
“distance closing” is not validated, hence no alarm is issued, although the
distance is less than minimum separation and is either maintained constant
or even increasing slightly.
To further extend our discussion, we look at possible continuations of the
scenario after the bad state is reached. If, after a subsequent update, the
distance is closing, a warning will be issued and the “missed alarm” situation
will cease to exist. The only way to perpetuate the problem is shown in
Figure 6 which is an extension of Scenario 3. The target can stay within
minimum separation radius for a longer period of time if it “zig-zags” in front
of ownship, and at each radar update, it has the exact same distance D to
ownship. The target has to zig-zag to maintain the distance, since following a
parallel path to ownship will cause the algorithm to label it as taking oﬀ. The
alarm criterion for the new combination of operational states is “taking oﬀ in
the same direction and distance less than minimum separation”. Therefore,
an alarm will be issued as soon as the target stops zig-zagging.
The case when the target is not an aircraft but a vehicle, such as a service
truck, adds an extra degree of freedom for “malicious behavior” of the target
(see Scenario 5, in Figure 7). Ground vehicles are always considered in taxi
mode by the protocol, regardless of their speed, heading, and physical coor-
dinates. Therefore, as in Scenario 4, the target may follow ownship at close
distance, and even continue chasing ownship after it is lined up for takeoﬀ and
accelerating. No ﬂag will be raised for the same reasons as in Scenario 4.
For the most recent implementation of RSM, the designers took into ac-
count our ﬁndings and eliminated the special treatment given to ground vehi-
cles. This addresses the situation in Scenario 5.
The situation in Scenario 4 is of less concern, since it is extremely diﬃcult
to realize in practice, even intentionally by a saboteur. At the same time, there
is some beneﬁt in exposing it: the designer is aware of this low-probability
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ownship = taxi
target = taxi
distance = D
alarm = OFF
ownship = takeoff
target = taxi
distance = D
alarm = OFF
ownship position
target position
min. sep. radius
Fig. 6. Scenario 4 (ground level).
ownship = taxi
target = taxi
distance = D
alarm = OFF
ownship = takeoff
target = taxi
distance = D
alarm = OFF
ownship position
target position
min. sep. radius
Fig. 7. Scenario 5 (aircraft vs. vehicle).
event, and also, by the fact that is the only remaining unwanted behavior in
the system, it serves as a validation for phase 3 of the RSM algorithm.
6 Conclusions and future work
Several lessons were learned from our analysis, ﬁrst and foremost that our for-
mal veriﬁcation approach has an undeniable value. At the end of our study,
most of it concerned with modeling decisions, we presented the RSM designers
with a list of important ﬁndings which were not exposed during the testing ac-
tivities, involving real aircraft, already underway at diﬀerent airport locations.
The merit of our technique is that, besides being considerably less expensive,
it is exhaustive.
We were able to analyze all possible scenarios in our model and found
scenarios of potential concern that happen with extremely low probability.
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These are almost impossible to expose during either testing procedures, which
usually aﬀord no more than a dozen test ﬂights a day, or simulation sessions.
When compared to the actual state-space sizes of the order of 1013 − 1042
states, this shows the need for exhaustive analysis. The second outcome of
our experiments was that, after identifying the problems and suggesting mod-
iﬁcations to the protocol to eliminate them, we have increased the level of
assurance of the design in what concerns missed alarms.
With respect to the dual analysis of false alarms, this is still on the list of
future research plans. From a practical point of view, pilots are equally con-
cerned with both types of situations. Individual reports indicate that frequent
false alarms can become a nuisance or, worse, a distraction in operating an
airplane. It is also the case that a system with too many false alarms will tend
to be switched oﬀ or ignored, thus rendering it de facto useless. Therefore,
the occurrence rate of false alarms has to be reduced, even though these are
not as critical as missed alarms, which should be completely eliminated. The
designers of the protocol had to come up with a balanced solution trading
the simplicity of very “loose” requirements that raise too many alarms for the
complexity of “stricter” conditions that decrease the number of false alarms,
but make the analysis more diﬃcult.
Another aspect not discussed here is fault tolerance. We assumed that all
scenarios happen in the absence of communication faults, meaning that the
radars and data-links provide accurate and timely updates to all participants.
A natural extension of our analysis is to include faulty behaviors, of either
benign nature (missed or late updates) or malicious/Byzantine (inconsistent
data between participants). This type of analysis requires the inclusion of
probabilistic aspects in the model, and will be the subject of further research.
While our work veriﬁes the correct operation of RSM under no-fault as-
sumptions, the presence of faults on the data-link may signiﬁcantly impact
the correct operation of the algorithm. It is no easy task to design a model
that takes faulty data into account, since realistic faults might be diﬃcult to
model. On the one hand, if all data is faulty, incursions are completely un-
avoidable no matter how good RSM is otherwise. On the other hand, if no
data is faulty, we have already demonstrated the correctness of the algorithm.
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